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Abstract 
This article studies the collaboration between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists in the socialist transformation 
of their shared borderlands after the First Indochina War, which both complicates and clarifies the volatile bilateral 
relationship between the two emerging Communist states as they solidified their power in the 1950s.  Departing from 
traditional narratives of Sino-Vietnamese relations that focus on wars and conflicts, this article examines how the 
timely convergence of Cold War and state expansion transformed the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands from 1954 to 
1957. Using both Chinese and Vietnamese archival sources, it contends that the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists 
pursued two interrelated goals in carrying out the political projects at the territorial limits of their countries. First, they 
wanted to build an inward-looking economy and society at the respective borders by consolidating the national 
administration of territory. Second, they wanted to impose a contrived Cold War comradeship between the PRC and 
the DRV over and in place of the organic interdependence of people within the borderlands that had already existed 
for centuries in the area. The Sino-Vietnamese border, therefore, encountered joint state-building by the two 
Communist governments, which made the cross-border movement of people and goods more visible, manipulable, 
and, more importantly, taxable to the state. 
 
Introduction: border-making projects and the Cold War 
The Sino-Vietnamese border endured ‘one of the most intense and volatile bilateral relations in 
Asia’ during the Cold War, when the Sino-Vietnamese relations developed from ‘revolutionary 
collaboration, national alliance, armed hostility’ to ‘normalization’.1 Existing historiography on 
the Sino-Vietnamese relations during the Cold War almost exclusively focuses on higher-level 
diplomacy between Beijing and Hanoi during the Indochina Wars.2 The South China Sea disputes 
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further reinforce the tendency of scholars to focus on the sources of recent political animosity and 
territorial contention between China and Vietnam.3 An understudied yet important topic is how 
the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists conceived and launched the political projects of border-
making as they assumed power in their respective country at the beginning. This article fills this 
historiographical gap by concentrating more on the collaboration between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese Communists in the socialist transformation of their shared borderlands after the First 
Indochina War. It reveals that, on the one hand, not all interactions between Beijing and Hanoi 
centred on war or preparation for war; on the other hand, the two Communist states encountered 
security challenges along their boundaries that were, in fact, not always disputed.4  
This article makes three historiographical interventions. First, it extends the temporal scope of 
scholarship on the history of the Sino-Vietnamese border, especially concerning how Chinese and 
Vietnamese states established themselves there during the modern era. In her study of the relations 
between Ming China and Vietnam, Kathlene Baldanza argues that negotiation, instead of 
aggression and resistance, was the central theme to the formation of ‘the cultural, historical, and 
political borders of the two countries’.5 Vũ Đường Luân’s examination of border disputes between 
the Nguyễn and Qing courts reveals that the quest for autonomy by local communities at the Sino-
Vietnamese borderlands ‘led to the intervention by and expansion of these two states, as well as 
negotiations and territorial division between them’. 6  Certain local groups also served as 
powerbrokers of the state. As Bradley Camp Davis illustrates, from the late nineteenth century to 
the early twentieth, the imperial states of China, Vietnam, and the French protectorate all recruited 
bandits to extend power into the China-Vietnam borderlands.7 The Tai and other ethnic groups in 
the Black River Basin enjoyed controlled autonomy under the colonial rule yet the traditional 
leaders such as chief heads gradually lost their power with the rise of modern Vietnamese state 
during the anti-colonial war.8 However, this scholarship has mainly focused on the period before 
the second half of the twentieth century. This article shows that during the Communist era, the two 
neighbouring Communist states collaborated in their political projects of border-making, which 
made it increasingly difficult for the local community to maintain autonomy. 
Second, this article seeks to contribute to the productive historiography on institutional 
processes that helped states expand their power into borderlands in different parts of the world and 
the challenges that centralizing governments confront there. Recent scholarship on borderlands 
favours a cross-border perspective in order to study ‘the region on both sides of a state border as 
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the unit of analysis’.9 Peter Sahlins stresses in his study of the Pyrenean frontier of France and 
Spain that ‘states did not simply impose the boundary or the nation on local society’. Instead, by 
‘defining their own social and territorial boundaries, village communities, peasants and nobles, 
made use of the national state and its boundaries’, therefore ‘bringing the nation into the village’.10 
In North America, the study of borderlands intersects well with Native American history and 
environmental history.11 Cooperation between neighbouring countries in boundary-making was 
important in the formation of American borders. In her study of Western U.S.-Mexico border, 
Rachel St. John analyses a U.S.-Mexican ‘shared binational experience’ to subdue Apaches and 
land pirates in the borderlands and to promote capitalist growth in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.12 A similar binational project also took place at the Sino-Vietnamese border in the 1950s 
but was driven by a different ideology and a strong sense of regime insecurity. This article thus 
enters the conversation among historians focusing on different geographical areas regarding 
various motives of state-building at the borderlands.  
Third, by crafting a narrative of the twentieth century border-making projects in the dyadic 
world of the Cold War, this article contributes to a ‘pericentric view’,13 which goes beyond the 
study of strategic calculations of the great powers. Cold War historians have often framed the rise 
and fall of the troubled partnership between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in terms of the evolving American-Sino-Soviet strategic 
triangle. The two Communist countries, united under the shared perception of American threat in 
the 1950s, drifted apart as the Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the 1960s, and they eventually 
became adversaries as a result of the American rapprochement with China.14 Diplomatic historians, 
nevertheless, have paid scant attention to the way in which Sino-Vietnamese relations were also 
driven by significant efforts to tackle the legacy of empires and colonialism. Building upon recent 
scholarship on state-society relations in Asian borderlands during the Cold War,15 this article 
stresses that ideological conflicts between communism and capitalism shaped the political projects 
of the Communists to cut cross-border ties, which was often deemed capitalist.  
This article contends that the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists pursued two interrelated 
goals in carrying out the political projects at the territorial limits of their countries. First, they 
wanted to build an inward-looking economy and society at the respective borders by consolidating 
the national administration of territory. Second, they wanted to impose a contrived Cold War 
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comradeship between the PRC and the DRV over and in place of the organic interdependence of 
people within the borderlands that had already existed for centuries in the area. The Sino-
Vietnamese border, therefore, encountered joint state-building by the two Communist 
governments, which made the cross-border movement of people and goods more visible, 
manipulable, and, more importantly, taxable to the state.  
The first step toward meeting these goals, with the end of the First Indochina War, was the 
establishment of Communist institutions, characterised by the nationalization of trade, the 
collectivization of agriculture, and restriction on migration emerging on both sides of the border. 
As a result, border residents found it increasingly difficult to circumvent the state by exploiting 
different political situations in the two countries as they had done in the past. Even so, the two 
Communist states confronted a twofold challenge at their borderlands. First, the state extended its 
reach to the border not in a uniform fashion but through its discrete parts, which generated the 
problem of coordination within the bureaucracy, particularly between the centre and local 
administrations. Second, the more culturally diverse and fluid on-the-ground realities of 
borderlands fitted neither the nationalist nor the internationalist agenda of the two states. 
The Sino-Vietnamese border was a geographically diverse area that consisted of shared access 
to the Gulf of Tonkin and a land border ranging from lower valleys to mountainous highlands. 
This article only focuses on the hilly lowland border along Guangxi and Guangdong of China and 
along Cao Bằng, Lạng Sơn, and Hải Ninh of Vietnam. 16  Whereas the upland geography of 
Yunnan-northwestern Vietnam was conducive to political autonomy against the central authority, 
the lowland border had encountered more-ambitious state-building projects. Since the end of the 
Sino-French War (1883-1885), both the French colonial government of Indochina and successive 
Chinese central regimes and military strongmen (following the fall of the Qing dynasty) made 
determined efforts to exercise control in this borderland area. Wars and conflicts during the first 
half the twentieth century, however, rolled back many of these attempts. In short, the eastern part 
of the Sino-Vietnamese border witnessed complex state-society interactions, which allows a more 
complex examination of the continuities and discontinuities in state-building and local resistance.  
This article focuses on the initial years after the First Indochina War, from the Geneva 
Conference in the summer of 1954 to the end of 1957. In the mid-1950s, the international relations 
of East Asia and the domestic politics of the PRC and the DRV underwent a period of relative 
stability.17 With the end of the Korean War in July 1953, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
shifted away from a radically revolutionary perception of international affairs and adopted a more 
modest direction in foreign policy. 18  To break diplomatic isolation and create a favourable 
international environment for domestic consolidation, Premier Zhou Enlai opened dialogues with 
France and Great Britain at the Geneva Conference, introduced the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence with India and Burma, and called for cooperation between Asian and African 
countries at the 1955 Bandung Conference. Meanwhile, China’s First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) 
set ambitious economic objectives, including promoting socialist industrialization through Soviet-
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assisted projects, developing agricultural cooperatives, and establishing state capitalism in 
commerce.19 The DRV, emerging victorious from the First Indochina War, likewise faced the 
pressing issue of regime consolidation. The Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP) took a pragmatic 
‘North-first’ policy to preclude American intervention and to heal the wounds of war.20 In late 
1954 and early 1955, the DRV leaders formulated the Three-Year Plan for Economic Recovery 
(1955-1957), with land reform as the core project.21 The shared priorities on economic growth, 
political centralization, and regional stability geared Beijing and Hanoi toward more-concerted 
efforts to increase their institutional presence at the border. 
This article begins with an examination of the development of border police and the 
institutionalization of border authorities. This initiated a process that transformed the Sino-
Vietnamese frontiers from less monitored spaces to areas subject to particular regimes of 
regulation, discipline, control, and surveillance. The article then traces how the end of the First 
Indochina War changed the Communist perception of the cross-border trade networks and shows 
how the two governments collaborated in marginalizing private commerce at the border markets. 
More importantly, Chinese and Vietnamese officials decided to turn their respective border 
societies inward by severing the transnational social ties, which will be studied in the third part. 
The two Communist states, however, had to find a balance between the construction of socialism 
and political realism on the ground. A 1956 meeting of representatives of border provinces, 
examined at the end of the article, reveals a series of challenges to the political projects of 
Communist border-making.  
 
Watch out for the enemy inside: the development of border police 
 
One of the first projects of the modernizing central states was to establish a system of disciplined 
border guards to selectively block flows of people, ideas, and goods across the border. The people 
of the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands had long been partners in realms such as trade, agriculture, 
and marriage. In particular, the activities of bandits, smugglers, and political opponents at the 
border concerned imperial and colonial officials. In 1896, the Qing court and the French colonial 
government decided to establish postes militaires doubles (duixun in Chinese) at important border-
crossings to police the international boundary settled after the Sino-French War. The Chinese-
Vietnamese border, however, remained poorly enforced before the second half of the twentieth 
century.22 During the First Indochina War, the PRC and the DRV had developed preliminary 
border garrison systems at their respective borders. The two sides cooperated in crushing remnant 
Chinese Nationalist troops and French colonial forces, while being rather flexible on managing the 
cross-border economic and social connections. After the restoration of peace in Indochina, the two 
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Communist states adopted the Soviet model of treating border controls as integral parts of the 
political institutions that reinforced the domestic political stability. Borders epitomized an all-
encompassing Communist party-state by performing ‘both economic and internal-security 
functions’. Highly restrictive regulations on cross-border movements ‘complemented the Soviet 
Union’s strong territorial defences, its strict internal surveillance regime, and its state-planned 
economy’.23 
The end of the First Indochina War coincided with a nationwide effort by the Chinese 
Communist state to institutionalize and formalize its border police system. The sixth national 
meeting of public security in 1954 stipulated that border police forces should ‘integrate the 
missions of armed patrol, administrative management, and secret surveillance’. Frontier defence, 
the meeting decided, was ‘not only military defence but also political defence; not only open 
struggle but also secret struggle; not only the mission of the border police but also the mission of 
the party, state, military, and people in the border region’.24  This broad conceptualization of 
frontier defence, which encompassed both the internal political stability of China’s frontier regions 
(bianjiang) and the protection of borders (bianjing) from external aggression, reflects China’s 
ethnic geography as an ‘empire state’ and its concerns over unrest at minority-populated 
frontiers.25 Communist China inherited the ‘geo-body’26 of the expansionist Qing Empire, which 
had resorted to various empire-building techniques. On its west frontier, the Manchu rulers secured 
their conquest of the eastern part of Central Eurasia by defeating the Zunghars and competing with 
the Russian Empire.27 On its southern frontier, the Qing court used more-scientific cartography for 
a more precise delineation of territory and created ethnographic writings with direct observation 
to administer the people.28 In the Tai-populated southwest Yunnan, although Han migration and 
military officials were key to the integration of the area to the Qing empire, the strength of the 
Qing state on the ground was restrained, as it had to compete with the Burmese and Siamese states 
for authorities and resources.29 As the Chinese Communist came to power, its southern border 
assumed strategic importance due to perceived hostility from the outside and challenges to the 
regime in the newly occupied border provinces.  
After the complete French retreat from northern Vietnam, the China-Vietnam border became 
one between two politically trusted contiguous countries. The Chinese border police, therefore, 
downgraded its military function of surveillance and reallocated resources to guarding against 
potential reactionaries within the country. In late 1954, counties along Guangxi’s border began to 
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establish ‘border work committees’ consisting of personnel from the military, the border police 
and inspection stations, public security, transportation, customs, bank, and trade offices ‘to unify 
thought and actions in defending and constructing the land and maritime border’. 30  Such 
arrangement reflected problems that could arise when different branches of the government and 
the military had their own representatives at the border who received orders from their respective 
higher authority without much consultation from each other. Again reflecting a perceived need for 
coordination, a provincial directive noted that the military task of the border police focused on 
‘checking smuggling and illegal immigration, arresting infiltrating and fugitive spies and bandits, 
and defending against airdrops and air raids’, all of which, however, entailed ‘coordination 
between state agencies’ and ‘reliance on a mass line’. 31 
Cold War concerns also entered into border defence calculations, focusing mainly on potential 
threats from the United States and the Washington-backed Republic of China on Taiwan. Citing 
the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the coming into force 
of the Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China as signs of 
America’s encirclement of Red China, a Guangxi provincial administration directive in March 
1955 required the border counties to guard against American-supported ‘conspiracy against our 
border area’ and ‘counterrevolutionaries who fled from the inland to the frontier’. It urged all 
border county administrations to establish ‘border work committees’ at the earliest possible date, 
and it demarcated a ‘border defence zone’ that encompassed all the border towns.32  
Reflecting shifting priorities, the border inspection station of the Friendship Pass, a historical 
gateway and border marker that connected Pingxiang County of Guangxi with the Vietnamese 
town of Đồng Đăng in Lạng Sơn, 33 removed the branch that was in charge of wartime military 
surveillance in July 1955.34 The border police forces at the coastal county Qinzhou were required 
to conduct ‘a thorough investigation of fled or detained counterrevolutionaries, heads of feudal 
secret societies, families of the counterrevolutionaries, landlords, former Nationalists, and people 
inclined to be taken advantage of by the enemies, such as habitual criminals and vagabonds’.35 By 
crushing possible conspiracies between its internal and external enemies, the Chinese Communist 
state sought to transform its southwestern border from a historical asylum for politically ostracized 
individuals into a socialist stronghold against perceived aggression of the capitalist camp. 
Besides detecting and suppressing potentially subversive activities, controlling the cross-border 
activities of the local populations gained in importance on the agenda of the border police forces. 
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During the First Indochina War, the border authority was required ‘to show consideration to the 
economic lives of the two peoples’,36 which resulted in a rather flexible state intervention into the 
cross-border networks. Furthermore, a lack of experience in border inspections and knowledge of 
local culture and geography left the border police with little expertise in enforcing the borderline. 
Even so, there was a tendency toward growing institutionalization of border regulation. In 
December 1954, Fangcheng County decided to place more-stringent restrictions on border people 
who visited families and friends, attended seasonal fairs, obtained firewood, or transported 
buffalos37 across the border. It prohibited the border people from crossing the borderline along 
unpatrolled trails or passes not officially opened for travel. For those facing economic difficulties, 
only people living within 20 kilometres from the borderline were permitted to exit the country at 
designated places with a temporary visa. Meanwhile, traders from Vietnam with documents issued 
by Vietnamese authorities would still be allowed to enter China.38 As revealed in the next section, 
with the nationwide collectivization of the economy, cross-border economic connections were 
soon deemed feudalist, opportunist, and unpredictable.  
The VWP took similar steps in institutionalizing its border police, yet it was more lenient on 
spontaneous cross-border connections with Communist China than with other neighbouring 
countries. In October 1955, the Ministry of Public Security of the DRV convened a border police 
meeting where it admitted that ‘the organization of the Vietnamese border garrison [was] weak, 
and the control of the local party committees on border defence [was] not tight, which [left] many 
loopholes for enemies to take advantage of’. The meeting stipulated that the mission of border 
police was ‘to incorporate the three aspects of administrative management, secret surveillance, and 
armed patrols under the leadership of the Party Central, with reliance on the people, and in close 
collaboration with other departments’.39 The wording of this statement showed a clear impact of 
the Chinese military doctrine of border defence that treated the inspection of cross-border activities 
and the transformation of border societies as inseparable.  
Such concerns can be seen in a number of cases and actions.  In July 1956, the Vietnamese 
border police were required to investigate the geography, population, and society of the borderland 
and the coast; more specifically, they were required ‘to strike hard on the conspiracy between the 
imperialists and the bandits at sea’. On the land border, the DRV government prescribed that the 
area around 20 kilometres from the borderline with China fell under the administration of the 
border police, whereas the border defence zone with Laos was expanded to 50 kilometres due to 
the absence of diplomatic relations between the DRV and the Royal Lao Government. At the 
Vietnam-China border, the focal point of the border regulation was to carry out regular inspections 
at border ports such as Móng Cái, Đồng Đǎng, Tà Lùng, and Lào Cai. At the communities 
bordering Laos, by contrast, the border police were to closely monitor the activities of dwellers 
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who sought to enter Laos to visit families or purchase necessities. The local officials were expected 
to conduct a thorough investigation at the border communes, make lists and create profiles of 
people engaged in the cross-border activities, and only permit politically reliable people to travel 
to Laos.40 
The Chinese-Vietnamese border acquired even greater importance to Beijing and Hanoi after 
the railway systems of the two countries connected near the Friendship Pass in 1955. 41  In 
November 1951, the PRC extended its Hunan-Guangxi railroad to the Guangxi-Vietnam border to 
transport military aid to the Viet Minh. The section within Guangxi was among the first railways 
constructed by the revolutionary regime, indicating the high priority of supporting the DRV on 
China’s political agenda. In the mid-1950s, connecting the Vietnamese transportation system with 
the socialist bloc was vital to the economic recovery of the DRV42 because the country was located 
at the periphery of the socialist camp and was geographically separated from the Soviet Union by 
China. In December 1954, the DRV decided to repair the railroad between Hanoi and Đồng Đăng 
and link the line with the main Chinese rail net near the Friendship Pass.  
Under the Agreement of the PRC Assisting the DRV in Repairing Railways, the Chinese Ministry 
of Railway provided locomotives, vehicles, and other equipment to the DRV and sent technicians 
and construction teams to restore 166.9 kilometres of the Hanoi-Friendship Pass railroad.43 The 
Vietnamese railroads originally constructed by the French in this area used a 1,000 mm (3ft 3 3⁄8 
in) ‘narrow’ gauge due to the mountainous terrain along the route, whereas the standard gauge of 
the Chinese railroad was 1,435 mm (4 ft 8 1⁄2 in). To solve the problem of different gauges, the 
two countries agreed to have the Vietnamese narrow-gauge rail extend into Pingxiang, the first rail 
station within China, where the Chinese would construct a reloading yard to transfer materials 
between the two tracks.44 The whole project was completed in February 1955, and the line was 
officially opened on 1 August 1955. This turned the Guangxi-Vietnam frontier into a bustling land 
transportation hub between the two Communist countries.45  
Along with the growing military and economic significance of remote border towns such as 
Pingxiang and Đồng Đăng, the two Communist states tightened social controls of the area along 
the railway. Because socialism was a modernization project, Communist countries were eager to 
embrace advanced transportation technologies and to make domestic mobility an instrument of 
social change. Nonetheless, local administrations were also ‘highly ambivalent in their attitudes 
toward the opportunities these technologies and mobility offered to their subjects’.46 After the 
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opening of the Sino-Vietnamese Railway, the border authority at the Friendship Pass took charge 
of the customs inspections at Pingxiang station. It thoroughly investigated the social conditions 
around the locality and created detailed records of ‘suspected enemies’. Among those arrested 
were ordinary people who confessed plans to flee to Saigon by hopping on a passing train and 
spies who collected intelligence in the station disguised as rail workers.47 The Chinese state’s close 
surveillance of the communities along the railroad echoed similar trends on the other side of the 
boundary line. In June 1955, the VWP decided that agrarian reform in the minority regions would 
not commence as early as in the Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese)-populated provinces. However, areas 
along the Sino-Vietnamese railroad were made an exception to this lenient policy because some 
of the tribes had collaborated with the French during the First Indochina War.48  
The institutionalization of Chinese and Vietnamese border police systems broadly reflected 
public security campaigns in the mid-1950s to consolidate border defence in the two adjacent 
countries. The leaderships of the PRC and the DRV held a disturbing vision of frontiers due to an 
international environment they viewed as hostile and a determination to eliminate domestic 
counterrevolutionaries. Although the two Communist countries were then Cold War partners that 
did not pose a direct political or military threat toward each other, they needed to address the 
historical legacy of state weakness at the borderlands. Borders, as George Gavrilis argues, are not 
simply ‘lines of separation between states’ but ‘institutions that directly contribute to state 
formation and state authority’.49 The Chinese and Vietnamese attempts to buttress national borders 
through the police systems are as much about preventing internal counterrevolutionaries from 
escaping the country as about keeping the external enemy out of their territories. Furthermore, the 
border garrisons, among other border-making institutions, helped the two Communist states to 
exploit the borderlands to their own advantage by hampering long-existent cross-border economic 
and social ties.  
 
A farewell to Business: the marginalization of spontaneous cross-border trade 
 
The cross-border trade in the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands operated by the overseas Chinese 
traders (Huaqiao in Chinese, Hoa kiều in Vietnamese) assumed strategic importance to the central 
states in the twentieth century. After the fall of Guangzhou and other coastal ports to the Japanese 
in 1938, the rail lines, highways, and rivers crossing the Sino-Vietnamese border became China’s 
lifeline to transport foreign military aid, food supplies, and commercial goods.50 Likewise, during 
the initial years of the First Indochina War, overseas Chinese traders and ‘their profoundly trans-
national commercial networks running throughout all of Southeast Asia’ played a unique role in 
sustaining Viet Minh’s struggle against the French by enabling the Vietnamese to procure large 
amounts of arms, chemicals, medicines and cotton materials.51  As the PRC became the first 
country to recognize the DRV in January 1950, the two nations began to establish trade relations 
at the border. In July 1952, Beijing and Hanoi decided to open several border crossings between 
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China and the ‘liberated zone’ of Vietnam for ‘small-scale border trade’.52 The two states would 
levy taxes and stabilize prices at the border markets with the participation of state-run companies. 
Carrying border trade licenses issued by the local administrations, the borderland residents could 
sell and purchase daily necessities at these markets, and the overseas Chinese traders continued to 
profit from the cross-border trade.53 
After the Geneva Agreements put an end to the war between French Union forces and the Viet 
Minh in Summer 1954, the activities of the itinerant merchants became increasingly problematic 
to the Communist states. The ceasefire in Indochina led to a sudden outpouring of Vietnamese 
products into the Chinese border markets. ‘As the DRV emerged as an integral market thanks to 
the restored peace and resumed transportation’, according to a report by the state-run West 
Guangxi Trade Company, merchants (especially overseas Chinese traders) from Hanoi and other 
major cities were eager to expand their sale northward to the borderlands to sell off goods 
overstocked during the war. Responding to this situation, peddlers and store owners from other 
parts of China, such as Guangdong and Shanghai, travelled to the border to purchase Vietnamese 
herbs, spices, and dried fish.54 The rising number of private merchants at the border markets drove 
up the price of Vietnamese goods and obstructed the state-run enterprises’ plan to purchase the 
majority of Vietnamese products at a fixed low price (a standard practice of the socialist economy 
to extract revenues from the agricultural sector to fund the development of heavy industry). 
Meanwhile, the sales of Chinese light industrial products and salt plummeted after July 1954, 
reducing the profits of the Chinese state-run companies and weakening the dominance of the public 
sector in the border economy.55  
Blaming private business for destabilizing border markets, the Chinese state decided to place 
restrictions on itinerant traders from outside the border area. In late 1954, the Chinese government 
tried to quarantine the border markets from the rest of the country by not issuing trade licenses to 
people who lived more than 20 kilometres away from the borderline on the Chinese side.56 This 
measure of cracking down on private business not only led to significant growth in market share 
by local state-run companies but also the interruption of transnational exchanges between Southern 
China and Indochina. This was a marked example of the state’s scheme to define its borders and 
restructure the relations between the borderlands and the inland.  
As the state-run companies secured a monopoly at the Chinese border markets through a 
socialist war on commerce, the tension between the local administrations and the border dwellers 
heightened. Once the Chinese central state’s decision to preclude outside merchants trickled down 
the bureaucratic hierarchy, the policy translated into ‘a widespread hostility among the cadres 
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against all private shopkeepers’.57 The Guangxi provincial administration, for instance, stipulated 
that ‘the socialist transformation of the private commerce should be carried out at the border area 
earlier than that in the inland’.58 Many local traders in the border towns fell into poverty after late 
1954. They were deprived of the right to trade at the border markets and yet ‘were not arranged 
properly’ to find new methods of living.59 Meanwhile, as a result of the exclusion of private 
commerce, local farmers had no choice but to sell their goods to the state-run companies. Even the 
report of the Ministry of Commerce admitted that the procurement price arbitrarily determined by 
the state-run companies ‘had incurred a negative impact among the masses’. The local people 
complained that ‘the [state-run] trade companies [forced] prices down more aggressively than the 
private merchants [had done] during the Nationalist era’.60  
Restrictions on private merchants imposed by the Chinese government, however, did not suffice 
to guarantee profits for its state-run companies, due to the volatile demand from Vietnam. In April 
1955, Chinese state trade agents at Dongxing, a historical trading hub connecting to Vietnam’s 
Móng Cái through a bridge on the Beilun River (Ka Long River in Vietnamese), complained about 
the unpredictability of the cross-border trade already under their supervision. With Vietnam still a 
‘free market’, they reported, ‘our trade is poorly planned. We can hardly draft credible plan 
because it is hard to obtain reliable information on what exactly the Vietnamese side needs’.61  
The awkward situation encountered by the Chinese state-run companies was a striking example 
of the resilient cross-border commercial networks against the manipulation of the state when the 
social economic conditions in the two neighbouring countries differed significantly. The CCP had 
consolidated its authority and credibility by a series of political campaigns, especially a nationwide 
suppression of ‘reactionaries and reactionary activities’ during the Korean War. 62 By contrast, the 
primary concern of the VWP leaders in the mid-1950s was to avoid alienating the mass who had 
supported the Viet Minh in its struggle for independence. Hanoi, therefore, adopted a more 
moderate economic policy. To put the economy on a stable footing after the cease fire, the VWP 
decided to leave trade and handicraft business in private hands.63 It was not until the DRV also 
carried out more-determined measures to exclude private traders from the border markets in 1957 
that the state-run companies of the two Communist countries more seriously undermined the 
centuries-long transnational trade networks between Southern China and Indochina. 
Besides competition with the itinerant traders, the Chinese trade companies were trapped in a 
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dilemma of being simultaneously instructed to accumulate wealth for the state, support local 
livelihood, and pursue the diplomatic goal of buttressing the DRV. When the CCP and the Viet 
Minh opened small-scale trade at the border market during the First Indochina War, they sought 
to achieve two objectives. On one hand, they hoped to maintain the livelihood of the borderland 
people. On the other hand, they needed to expand markets for Vietnamese products in China to 
support Viet Minh’s military struggle. Beijing required its state-run companies to buy the vast 
majority of the goods brought by the Vietnamese to the border markets, regardless of whether 
China needed them or whether the products were of satisfactory quality. The influx of Vietnamese 
goods after the end of the war left them severely overstocked with firewood, cane, and bamboo, 
which were without a ready market in China.64  
Reconciling competing border policies was also complicated when the post-war famine in the 
DRV made the border crossings crucial for Vietnamese supplies of rice, oil, and daily necessities. 
This reversed Guangxi’s historical role as a rice importer from Indochina to a rice exporter. Out 
of internationalist concerns, the Chinese state-run companies adopted different policies toward the 
Chinese and Vietnamese buyers at the border markets. Whereas Chinese citizens had to follow a 
strict monthly quota for rice and cooking oil and to use coupons to obtain cotton clothes, the 
Vietnamese could buy 15 kilogrammes of rice and 250 grammes of oil per person and any quantity 
of cotton clothes they wished.  
However, when the local officials realized that a sizeable number of buyers from Vietnam were 
itinerant merchants who resold the rice on Vietnamese markets, where food prices had been driven 
high by the famine, it imposed a five-kilogramme limit on the rice each person from Vietnam could 
purchase. The Ministry of Commerce, however, overruled this local decision, criticizing the 
reduced quota as ‘inappropriate’. Worried that failure to help the DRV feed its starving populations 
would compromise the socialist partnership, the ministry suggested that ‘the provincial 
government should strengthen support for the border markets regarding grain supply and 
processing’.65 This situation highlighted the significant challenge of implementing a centrally 
framed international strategy of a large country in a local context. The perceived importance of 
foreign affairs policies sometimes declined as they passed down the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
especially when carrying out foreign policies diverted limited resources from other tasks that were 
locally deemed just as important, if not more—including ensuring the fiscal survival of local state 
institutions.  
In July 1955, Beijing and Hanoi revised the protocol on small-scale border trade and signed a 
new treaty to establish direct trade relations between local state-run companies. The two 
agreements marked the coordinated efforts by the two socialist countries to marginalize small-
scale border trade and to nationalize the border economy. Earlier that year, Hanoi decided to 
monopolize the purchase of the major cash crops, such as coffee beans and tea, following the 
Chinese model, which helped narrow the price gap between the two countries.66  With local 
Chinese and Vietnamese companies directly trading with each other based on seasonal plans, the 
border markets declined in importance. The objective of the revised protocol, according to the 
Chinese State Council, was ‘to respond to the DRV’s transition into a period of peaceful 
construction after the ceasefire in Indochina and market change in the small-scale border trade in 
1954, to prevent private businessmen from engaging in speculation and profiteering at the border 
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markets, and to supply the means of production and subsistence to the border dwellers on the two 
sides’.67 The protocol was explicit that only border residents living within the 20-kilometre radius 
could attend the border markets, with a daily limit of commodities valued at ten Yuan Renminbi 
(RMB) or equivalent Vietnamese currency (VND). 68  To discourage a private cross-border 
economy, the DRV abolished an existing tax exemption policy for people who brought 
commodities under a value of five Yuan RMB or equivalent VND.69  
After the revised small-scale border trade protocol and the deals among local state-run 
companies took effect, both the variety of goods and the number of participants at the border 
markets dropped significantly. The socialist war on private commerce, however, was not an easy 
victory, given that even the local state representatives had reservations against the policy of 
excluding private traders altogether from the border markets. They admitted that private 
entrepreneurs had competed with state-run companies to purchase Vietnamese products by 
offering higher prices or placing orders in advance, and some of them may have even undertaken 
subversive political activities. However, excluding them altogether from the border markets did 
more harm than good because the state-run companies that focused on monopolizing the trade of 
major commodities fell short in meeting the daily demand of the border residents, especially 
regarding medicines, herbs, and buffalos.70 
By the time the two Communist leaderships reached the two trade agreements, they already had 
the nationalization of all cross-border trade in mind. Viewing both small-scale border trade and 
local state-run trade as makeshift and transitional arrangements, the two parties set an ambitious 
goal to gradually incorporate all cross-border transactions into the track of ‘formal, 
intergovernmental trade’.71 In the spring of 1956, Beijing and Hanoi decided to close all border 
markets by the end of June 1957, while making allowance for local dwellers to cross the border 
carrying small numbers of gifts and personal items.72 Even though the plan was not eventually 
carried out, the two Communist countries’ ambition to fix border people on either side of the 
borderline by monopolizing the supply of goods was manifested in this aggressive long-term 
solution to the cross-border trade. 
Although the cross-border trade networks increasingly became a target of joint inspection and 
regulation by the two socialist states, the itinerant merchants turned out to be highly resilient in 
the face of the suppression of private commerce, especially in the DRV. Unlike in China, where 
businessmen had lost management rights over their enterprises through state-imposed public-
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private joint ownership, the DRV did not hastily push for a state monopoly of commerce due to 
concerns of alienating the urban population. It was thus more challenging for the Vietnamese 
officials to block itinerant retailers from using border markets.  
In April 1957, the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s Office ordered the local governments along its 
border to take tougher measures to exclude ‘greedy merchants’ who ‘take advantage of the 
shortage of commodities in the domestic markets’. Hanoi blamed stores opened by these traders 
at the border area for making the border markets ‘disorderly and complicated’.73 More importantly, 
these non-native private shopkeepers had managed to monopolize the Vietnamese border markets 
and engage in the smuggling of contraband by bribing businessmen, ordinary people, and cadres 
in order to evade state-imposed trade restrictions. The DRV government, therefore, stipulated in 
August 1957 that retailers taking commodities to border from Hanoi, Haiphong, and other non-
border areas had to sell their goods to local Vietnamese state-run companies instead of directly 
trading with the Chinese. Moreover, only agricultural products from the border provinces could be 
exported to the border markets on the Chinese side, and imported Chinese goods were not to be 
sold to merchants outside the border area.74 Due to the aggressive joint state efforts to interfere 
with and profit from the spontaneous cross-border networks, the border markets shrank greatly 
after the summer of 1957, with fewer people applying for trade licenses and more crossing the 
border illegally through the less-patrolled trails. Chinese border authorities at Aikou, an officially 
opened border market, noted that while they used to welcome approximately 500 traders from 
Vietnam per day, there were almost no foreign visitors in August 1957.75 
Given the pivotal role of Huaqiao-Hoa kiều traders in the commercial networks between 
Southern China and Southeast Asia and their strong regional connections over the land, across the 
maritime border, and within Vietnam, their experience under the aggressive state suppression of 
private commerce in the China-Vietnam border area merits special attention.76 Even during the 
period of close socialist comradeship between Beijing and Hanoi, the Huaqiao merchants still 
enjoyed favourable treatment at the Chinese border markets because of their ethnic connections 
with Southern China and language skills. In June 1955, Vietnamese state representatives 
complained to the Chinese officials about the different treatment of the Vietnamese and Huaqiao 
merchants at the Chinese border markets: The Chinese state-run companies refused to purchase 
herbs brought by the Vietnamese because of their low quality, while accepting the same batch of 
products the Huaqiao traders sold the next day. ‘It has become a widespread experience among 
the Vietnamese’, added the Vietnamese officials, ‘that it is better to ask the Huaqiao to sell 
products on behalf of the Vietnamese’. An inspection group dispatched by the Guangxi provincial 
government later admitted that many Vietnamese peddlers believed that they were discriminated 
against at the Chinese border markets; therefore, they chose to hide their nationality and pretend 
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to be Huaqiao when dealing with the Chinese companies. The different treatment of Huaqiao and 
Vietnamese traders at the border markets incurred serious political consequences, which, as noted 
by the inspection group, ‘was a far cry from the principle of fostering the solidarity between the 
two peoples at the border—an internationalist spirit that drove us to open the small-scale border 
trade at the very beginning’.77 Realizing that the Sino-Vietnamese lips and teeth relationship 
promoted by the political centres did not translate into a persuasive sense of unity with the 
Vietnamese among the grass-roots Chinese cadres, the Guangxi provincial government had to 
emphasize the strategic significance of the small-scale border trade. The provincial customs 
authorities required the Chinese officials at the border to ‘get rid of the remnants of great-nation 
chauvinism or narrow nationalism, and uplift internationalism’. Favouring Huaqiao while 
discriminating against the Vietnamese people, they noted, would result in a serious political loss.78 
The experience of Huaqiao at the border markets suggested a striking continuity in the cross-
border economic exchanges, in which personal and ethnic connections gave rise to favouritism, 
despite an engineered friendship between the two political centres that required impartiality.  
    The marginalization of the small-scale border trade after the First Indochina War was the result 
of both the domestic campaigns of socialist transformation in China and Vietnam, which sought 
to construct a centrally planned command economy, and the cooperation between the two 
Communist regimes at the border markets that aimed at taking hold of economic exchanges. In his 
comparison of pre-modern and colonial states, James Scott argues that the decisive advantage of 
the modern state apparatus was as much in paperwork as in arms. Effective tax extraction is the 
end product of cadastral surveys, settlement reports, censuses, identity cards, and ‘a growing body 
of regulations and procedures’. 79  The Communist state, which had long mobilized from the 
bottom-up with finely woven officials, was exceptionally efficient in capturing and recording the 
status of each inhabitant, each piece of land, and each activity relevant to the state’s interest.80 The 
logic behind the two Communist countries’ regulation of border trade was first to make it visible 
to and taxable by the state by stipulating the locations of economic exchanges. They then followed 
a policy of excluding private merchants and establishing a monopoly of state-run companies at 
border markets in the hope that the inhabitants would eventually turn their back on the border and 
be integrated into a nationalized economy supervised by the political centres. However, ordinary 
people could turn their back on the state apparatus by exploring alternative spaces for cross-border 
exchanges. This underlined the dilemma of consolidating an all-encompassing state without 
alienating the people encountered by the Communist states when they extended their reach to the 
borderlands.  
 
Turning the border society inward: severing cross-boundary social ties 
 
    77 Guangxisheng Waishi Weiyuanhui [Foreign Affairs Office of Guangxi (hereafter GXWW)], ‘Munanguan kou’an 
maoyi gouxiao jinkou yinqi Yuenan shangfan buman you [Import policy of trade company at Munanguan causing 
discontent among Vietnamese peddlers]’, 16 June 1955, GZZD, X1-12-293, pp. 41-2. 
78 Nanning Haiguan [Nanning Customs], ‘Zhuanfa “guanyu Munanguan Aikou kou’an maoyi gouxiaozu shougou 
jinkou shulang yinqi Yuenan shangfan buman de tongbao” xizuzhi xuexi you [Forward “The notice about trade 
company at Aikou, Munan Guan, importing Shouliang Yam Rhizome and leading to discontent among the Vietnamese 
peddlers” and organize studies]’, 1 July 1955, GZZD, X1-12-296, p. 9. 
    79 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 94.  
    80 For differences between the strategies of the Communist Party and the ruling government at local level, see 
Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, California: 
University of California Press, updated and expanded edition, 2010); Alexander B. Woodside, Community and 
Revolution in Modern Vietnam (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin, 1976). 
 
The hunt for potential subversive individuals by the border police and the war on private cross-
border commerce by the state-run companies were not sufficient to create a Communist border. 
The two Communist states collaborated in making the border a point of contrast by turning the 
respective frontier societies inward. This joint state-building and border-making process required 
government intervention in people’s daily lives and greater control over local economies beyond 
restructuring commerce. For example, by reducing cross-border farming, the socialist states could 
more efficiently extract tax revenues and integrate the border societies into the centrally planned 
economy. The state would also reach into more-intimate aspects of the interactions between the 
border people, such as marriage.  
If the two Communist countries’ policies to nationalize cross-border trade represented a 
determination to make border crossings points of differences, their decision to eliminate cross-
border farming highlighted a more ambitious goal of enforcing the borderline. The issue of cross-
border farming initially emerged between Beijing and Hanoi as a tax problem. After the end of the 
First Indochina War, the Vietnamese local government asked Chinese farmers who owned or 
harvested from land in Vietnam to pay ‘overdue agricultural taxes’ for the period 1951 to 1954.81 
From surveys of cross-border croplands, the two governments quickly realized the existence of 
contested sovereignty and disputed territory along the border. This is a vivid example of how the 
extraction of surplus from a marginal society by the modernizing state led to territorial claims that 
could overlap with claims made by other countries engaged in similar state-building projects. 
Continuous wars and conflicts in the China-Vietnam border region since the late 1940s had 
undermined the strength of central states in the area and had given the local population significant 
leeway against political authorities. Before 1948, people from Guangxi and then west Guangdong 
who had land in Vietnam paid agricultural tax in the form of rice to the French Annam state. As 
the population increased in southern China, landlords acquired land in Vietnam by purchase, while 
agriculturalists did so through the practice of swidden.82 After the outbreak of the First Indochina 
War, some of them returned to Guangxi while keeping their land in Vietnam.83 Rent or transfer of 
land as dowry or betrothal gifts also caused cross-border farming.84 In 1949 and 1950, neither the 
colonial state nor the Viet Minh was able to levy tax from its northern border, and the Vietnamese 
Communist regime only started to collect tax in the area after 1951.85 Most of the land owners 
from China, however, were able to escape Vietnamese agricultural taxes during the war.  
The different pace of state-building in China and Vietnam also allowed perceptive borderland 
residents to exploit the disparity of state strength on the two sides. They defended themselves 
before the local Chinese officials by asserting that ‘they had attempted to carry rice to Vietnam as 
tax payment but were either blocked at the customs for a lack of legal documents to export crops 
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or were declined by the Vietnamese officials due to uncertainty of tax rates’. While a few border 
residents admitted that they took a gamble in assuming that the Vietnamese government was too 
weak, others emphasized that the Vietnamese government usually collected tax in February and 
March, when they had almost consumed all the rice they harvested in the previous year.86 With the 
Sino-Vietnamese socialist partnership in mind, the local officials labelled these state-evasion 
strategies as ‘great-nation chauvinism’.87 In the end, the Guangxi provincial government estimated 
that Chinese residents from ninety-four border towns owed the Vietnamese government 
approximately 750,000 to 1,000,000 kilogrammes of rice from 1951 to 1954. Meanwhile, most 
border people from northern Vietnam who farmed in China had paid agricultural tax to the Chinese 
government.88  
After the end of the First Indochina War, the tax implications of the consolidation of the 
Vietnamese Communist state soon reached the Sino-Vietnamese border. As instructed by Hanoi, 
the Vietnamese provincial administrations started to communicate with Chinese border counties 
in late 1954 about the overdue tax. They required that border people from China who had land in 
Vietnam pay agricultural taxes from 1951 to 1953 based on Vietnamese tax laws. As for the taxes 
from 1954 on, they proposed adding up the individual harvests in China and Vietnam, calculating 
the per capita output of rice in the household and then levying tax according to the Chinese tax 
rate. People from Vietnam who had land in China would pay agricultural tax in the same way.89  
Although the Vietnamese government’s request was an overt response to the need to increase 
revenue in the face of postwar food shortage, it was also linked to other, more-hidden issues. For 
example, the Vietnamese clearly desired to present the image of a functioning, legitimate, socialist 
Vietnamese state to its northern neighbour. Meanwhile, while available Vietnamese sources cannot 
confirm whether the Vietnamese government intentionally used agricultural tax to signal its 
territorial claims over disputed areas along the border, this issue certainly made the Chinese 
government more aware of the problem of contested sovereignty. The Office of Foreign Affairs of 
Guangxi, for instance, noted that some of the land claimed by the Vietnamese government fell 
under the administration of China’s Fangcheng County, according to a civilian map, while 
belonging to Vietnam on a military map. It insisted that ‘this issue [was] pertinent to national 
territorial sovereignty thus should be reported to the [CCP] Central Committee’.90 
The Chinese local government took various international and domestic factors into 
consideration when seeking a solution with the Vietnamese. As Hanoi’s most important ally, China 
had to respect and support Vietnam’s rights to extract resources from Vietnamese territory. 
Therefore, Fangcheng County ignored a grassroots organisation’s suggestion to ask the 
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Vietnamese to reduce taxes for impecunious peasants and ethnic minorities. 91  Meanwhile, a 
nationalist sentiment of defining and defending sovereignty shaped the Sino-Vietnamese relations 
even during the heydey of their Communist brotherhood. None of the provincial institutions 
involved in the discussion agreed with the Vietnamese proposal of calculating total rice output 
from both sides of the borderline as the basis for tax extraction in the future. Instead, provincial 
financial and foreign affairs offices came up with a program aimed at both keeping China’s 
agricultural statistics confidential from the Vietnamese and reducing cross-border land ownership. 
They proposed that each government would levy taxes from lower-income people according to the 
local tax rate and the average output of the town where the land was located. Since the majority of 
people engaged in cross-border farming were classified as ‘poor peasants’, whose harvest fell 
below the average, this tax scheme could discourage them from farming across the international 
boundary. As to landlords, the government would treat each foreign holder of the land on its 
territory as one household and impose progressive taxation, which would significantly increase 
their tax burden.92 The Chinese local government was also concerned that the Vietnamese request 
of all overdue taxes paid in full at one time would lead to social instability. The Guangxi provincial 
officials thus proposed to Beijing that the Chinese government paid taxes from 1951 to 1954 in 
full to Vietnam on behalf of the lower-income people. It further suggested that Beijing also make 
payments for those categorized as rich peasants, landlords, and businessmen but that the amounts 
would be deducted from their salaries.93 This proposal shows that the local state agents were 
protective of the border community, where the population identified as ‘ethnic minorities’ often 
overlapped with the economically disadvantaged group. 
The tax lever aimed at reducing the size of cross-border land ownership soon took effect. In late 
1955, Jingxi County reported to the Guangxi provincial government that some border people 
sought to give up cross-border farming by swapping land. In December, the provincial 
administration not only gave the green light to land swaps on ‘a voluntary and mutually beneficial 
basis’ but also decided to simplify the legal procedures in order to encourage future exchanges.94 
In January 1956, the International Department of Central Committee of CCP issued general 
guidelines that stated, ‘to facilitate border management and reduce disputes between border 
residents, [the local Chinese officials] should actively create favourable conditions to gradually 
reduce and eventually eliminate cross-border cultivated land’.95 Following these instructions, the 
local officials put forward plans to reduce cross-border farming and forestry by combining 
economic compensation and political campaigns. Fangcheng County, for instance, decided to offer 
monetary compensation equal to the total agricultural output of one to three years to people who 
had to give up their harvest in Vietnam. Moreover, party cadres sought to indoctrinate a national 
awareness among the borderlanders through the settlement of cross-border farming. People 
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affected by the policy were required to ‘lift the internationalist spirit, respect the territorial integrity 
of the DRV, and understand that it was entirely reasonable to return crop fields and forests to the 
Vietnamese’. Moreover, party cadres educated the border population ‘to make use of the abundant 
sources of our home country to develop socialism and improve living standard instead of relying 
on foreign countries’.96  
Because the two Communist states were assertive in claiming resources from their territory and 
turning the border society inward, the traditional strategy of borderlanders to stay autonomous, 
such as running away or moving between and around states,97  became less and less promising. 
Stateless space disappeared not only on the map but also in terms of administrative oversight. The 
effects of the policy to discourage cross-border farming, however, should not be overestimated. 
As shown in the next section of this article, it was not until a comprehensive land survey along the 
border in 1957 that the central governments even realized the sheer number of households involved 
in the cross-border farming and forestry.  
Besides economic connections, cross-border marriage and family ties arising with it formed a 
solid cultural foundation of the borderlands society that even the aggressive political projects of 
boundary-making could not shake. State intervention and regulation of cross-border marriage was 
a vivid example of the ramification of state-building at the marginal society, which historically 
had been spaces of juridical exception.  
Marriage became a practice of concern to the state in China in the early twentieth century. 
Extended families, arranged marriages, and polygamy were among the traditional social 
institutions that came under attack for thwarting China’s aspiration to transform itself into a 
modern nation. The Civil Code of the Republic of China marked a significant break from the role 
of the state in regulating marital practices in the past. It justified the state’s intervention into 
people’s intimate relations in the name of fostering citizens’ loyalty to the modern nation. 
Nevertheless, the reach of the state was too limited to shake the gender inequity and patriarchal 
structure, especially in the rural area.98 While the New Marriage Law of 1950 was among the first 
legislation promulgaed by the revolutionary regime, it was not until the mid-1950s that the 
provisions of the law, such as the establishment of civil registries, were widely publicized and 
strictly enforced.99  
It was against this background of nationwide marriage reform in China that potential conflicts 
of marriage laws became a concern for the local Chinese administrations at the border, long before 
the Marriage and Family Law of the DRV was established in 1959. In June 1954, Beijing issued a 
general guideline of how local administrations should deal with marriage between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese citizens in the border area. Cross-border marriage requests ‘should be permitted as 
long as it is not against the Marriage Law of our country or laws of the Vietnamese state’.100 Based 
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on this central decree, the Guangxi provincial government established an administrative procedure 
for cross-border marriage and divorce in June 1955.101  
In practice, however, adherence to the revolutionary concept of class struggle affected the 
Communist state’s attitude toward individual cases of cross-border marriage. Lin Deqing, for 
instance, was a landlord’s daughter in Longjin County who fled to Vietnam during the land reform 
launched by the Chinese Communists in the ‘newly liberated area’ in 1950. She married a 
Vietnamese in 1952, yet was arrested by the local Chinese ‘land reform work group’ and placed 
under custody in her hometown. In October 1955, Lin’s husband asked for her release through the 
Vietnamese police, which seemed less concerned with Lin’s class background. The authorities of 
Longjin County believed that Lin should be allowed to migrate to Vietnam as long as she ‘did not 
conspire with any spy agents or bandits’. The Foreign Affairs Office of Guangxi nevertheless 
overruled the moderate position of the border county and banned her emigration, citing her 
background as a diehard landlord who ‘felt discontent with the government and the people’.102 The 
revolutionary regime, in this case, was determined to divide a cross-border household when the 
marriage became a source of national insecurity. The class background determined the 
permeability of the boundary line for ordinary residents. 
What concerned local officials most was not whether to endorse individual cross-border 
marriage requests but how to resolve cross-border conjugal disputes, which required not only 
considerable time but also local knowledge beyond their understanding. The provincial 
government, for instance, prescribed that if a Chinese citizen filed a request to divorce a 
Vietnamese who did not live in China, the Chinese local administration should consult the opinions 
of the Vietnamese person and the Vietnamese government through the Vietnamese consulate in 
Nanning, the provincial capital of Guangxi.103 This instruction was deemed ‘too generalistic’ and 
‘difficult to implement’ for the lower-level authority. The local state agents were often trapped in 
a difficult choice between interference and stepping back when asked to resolve family disputes, 
especially those involving settlements of property and children.104  
A typical kind of cross-border marriage dispute was bigamy of Vietnamese women involving 
Vietnamese and Chinese men. It was not uncommon in the rural area for a married woman to 
escape from her household, either due to spousal violence or economic difficulty, and remarry. 
When the dispute happened between families on the two sides of the border, however, a complex 
international problem arose in the eyes of the local administration. Resolving cross-border marital 
conflicts became burdensome to the officials because the ordinary people often resorted to state 
authorities of their home country when they believed this would help them bargain for a better 
deal. In one such case, Pan Shimao, a peasant living at the Guangxi border, married a Vietnamese 
woman introduced by a Vietnamese matchmaker. It soon turned out that his ‘wife’ already had a 
husband in Vietnam, and she left Pan for her Vietnamese hometown after the wedding. Pan, 
therefore, rushed to Vietnam without any legal travel documents and asked the matchmaker to 
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return the commission and the bride price he had paid. Being rejected outright and bluntly, he 
angrily took away the matchmaker’s buffalo and wrangled with his wife’s family. After the 
Vietnamese border authorities communicated with the Chinese side, the county government of 
Pan’s residence sharply criticized him for being ‘chauvinist’ and ‘ignoring border regulations’, 
even if it was the Vietnamese woman’s fault for not divorcing first before marrying Pan. In the 
end, the Chinese and Vietnamese local administrators managed to persuade Pan Shimao to return 
the buffalo and the bride to return the betrothal gift she received from Pan.105 
Given the deep-rooted ethnic connections across the border and the considerable number of 
unresolved marriage disputes, the provincial court of Guangxi issued a guide to the local border 
authorities endorsing settlements through ‘persuasion’ or ‘conciliation’ within the community. 
This position was in stark contrast to the provincial government’s initial policy that stipulated 
settlement through diplomatic channels. As early as during the Yen’an period in the early 1940s, 
the Chinese Communist cadres had used ‘persuasion’ or ‘conciliation’ to resolve family 
differences. The Communists, after all, considered law to be valuable than other techniques of 
social reform, such as political education, mediation, and persuasion. 106  Besides ideological 
preferences, the provincial decision to avoid a diplomatic or legislative settlement of cross-border 
marital disputes was based on practical concerns. The provincial court of Guangxi admitted that:  
 
It is better to observe local customs through work (gongzuo) when resolving marital conflicts at the China-
Vietnam border. More specifically, the district and town governments should try their best to persuade the 
two litigants to mediate through the border authorities of the two countries who can represent the opinions 
of the two sides, or to let the two litigants directly resolve the disputes by consultation. Doing so can solve 
the problem more promptly than employing formal legal methods, which often takes a long time because it 
not only involves diplomatic relations between the two countries, but also the applicability of laws.107 
 
The on-ground-reality at the border rolled back the provincial government’s decision, which 
highlights the problem with treating all cross-border connections as international issues. While the 
sovereign ambition of a modern nation gave the state a justification to interfere with the most-
intimate aspects of the lives at borderlands, it imposed significant administrative burdens on the 
local agents. Largely due to the non-interventionist attitude of the local administration, problems 
inherent in transnational marriage, such as nationality, legal residence, and conflicts over marriage 
laws, remained shelved until a meeting between the border provinces in November 1956. 
 
Tensions between borderline administration and borderland realities: the meeting between 
border provinces in 1956 and its aftermath 
 
The five-province border conference between the representatives from China’s Guangxi and 
Guangdong and Vietnam’s Cao Bằng, Lạng Sơn, and Hải Ninh, hosted from 6 to 9 November 
1956 in Nanning, highlighted that state-building and border-making at the China-Vietnam 
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borderlands was an internationally coordinated project. The creation of all-encompassing states by 
two Communist regimes necessitated joint efforts by Beijing and Hanoi to squeeze a soft, poorly 
defended border space between them into a hard one with a more clearly defined borderline, the 
crossing of which came with higher political risk and economic costs. The fact that the meeting 
was between provinces of the eastern part of the China-Vietnam border might indicate that the two 
countries were more eager to work out a solution for border issues in the lowlands, where the states 
enjoyed stronger institutional strength than in the highlands. The Chinese and Vietnamese 
representatives admitted that for the immediate future, they needed to respect the centuries-long 
customs and cross-border connections for the sake of maintaining social stability and promoting 
production. Meanwhile, they also set a long-term objective of turning the borderland population 
away from the borderline.  
    Except for the rather sensitive issue of border demarcation, the provincial government was the 
appropriate level of political authority to negotiate a settlement for specific aspects of monitoring 
and reducing the mobility of people and goods across the border, such as land and forest ownership, 
buffalo trade, debts between border residents, nationality, marriages, and management of border 
defence zones. A division of responsibility between the central and provincial governments was 
manifested in the meeting agenda. The two sides shelved the issue of resolving potential border 
disputes but reached a consensus that ‘some of the boundary markers [had] been moved, which 
could incur disputes if the two parties [did] not resolve the problem’. Endorsed by the Party Central 
of the CCP and the VWP, the border provinces would scrutinize the issue, discuss a settlement, 
and report to party leaders.108 Beijing and Hanoi, meanwhile, would not be bogged down with a 
great number of decisions on issues that required local knowledge and meticulous attention. 
The first action taken by the representatives at the border province meeting was to normalize a 
series of established practices to reduce the border residents’ motives to cross the borderline and 
to undermine the deep-rooted transnational social networks. The two states’ attitudes to the cross-
border farming and forestry best signalled their determination to intrude into everyday life in 
borderlands. ‘To strengthen border management and avoid border disputes’, they planned, ‘the 
two sides [would] actively, firmly, and gradually decrease and withdraw altogether from land 
farmed by residents across the border.’ Besides encouraging voluntary land-swaps between 
holders of land and forests, the border provinces scheduled a thorough land investigation on each 
side followed by a formal exchange of land and forests starting in March or April 1957. Whereas 
cross-border farming on existing crop fields was temporarily permitted for peasants ‘facing real 
economic difficulties’, swiddening or transactions of land across the border were prohibited.109  
For cross-border ties less likely to cause contested territorial claims, the border provinces 
decided to respect ‘historical customs’. They agreed, for instance, not to restrict fishing or the 
passing boats from either country on the boundary river.110 As for cross-border debts, the border 
provinces permitted the county authorities to mediate disputes based on the laws of the creditor’s 
home country. They also made arrangements for the repayment of government bonds and debts 
borrowed by guerrillas and local troops from people on the other side of the border during the 
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Chinese Civil War and the First Indochina War.111  
Policies regarding cross-border marriage and nationalities reflected the two Communist 
countries’ uneasiness with the transnational fraternity fostered by ethnic bonds. In 1955, the PRC, 
which did not recognize dual citizenship, agreed in talks with the DRV that ‘all subjects of Chinese 
origin living in the DRV should be encouraged to assimilate on a voluntary and gradual basis into 
Vietnamese society’. 112   Beijing’s attitude to the Việt Kiều (overseas Vietnamese) in China, 
however, remained unclear. At the 1956 border province meeting, the Chinese representatives 
conveyed the opinions of the CCP leadership to the Vietnamese counterparts: The Kinh people 
who migrated to China after the PRC was founded were considered Việt Kiều. Those who moved 
to China before October 1949 and then made a career or had a legitimate occupation and settled 
down in China would also be ‘persuaded to keep their Vietnamese citizenship’. Only those 
insisting on obtaining Chinese nationality and Vietnamese women who married Chinese men 
might be allowed to change their citizenship.113  Beijing’s policy of non-assimilation perhaps 
indicates its concerns over the ethnic mosaic at the margin of its territory and the possibility of 
Vietnamese demanding favourable treatment once becoming an ethnic minority with a significant 
population.  
For cross-border marriages, the two countries agreed to adopt a ‘not banning but not 
encouraging’ policy as long as the marriage was not regarded illegal in the country where it was 
registered.114 More-flexible systems, however, were employed in the highlands. The two sides 
admitted that it was difficult to determine the citizenship of those considered ‘ethnic minorities’ 
who constantly moved back and forth across the borderline; therefore, these people could choose 
their nationality based on their residence at the time of registration. Moreover, local state 
representatives were instructed to ‘respect the long-established social, cultural, and family 
connections between the Mèo, Mán, and Lô Lô people’ dispersed along the border and to refrain 
from interfering in some of their marriage traditions, such as dowry.115 
Finally, the border provinces drafted a legal procedure for border crossing by border dwellers 
who lived within a 20-kilometre radius of the border. Considering the local population’s need to 
travel across the boundary for production, subsistence, and schooling, the two countries decided 
to open more unpatrolled trails managed by cadres of the border towns instead of border garrisons. 
Border dwellers who sought to cross the border for other ‘legitimate reasons’, such as paying 
homage to tombs, reuniting with relatives, or seeing a doctor, could apply for a temporary travel 
document valid for three to six months. In principle, they should take the officially opened border 
crossings, although exceptions could be granted to people residing in remote towns.116  
In 1957, the police authorities of Guangxi decided to impose stricter restrictions on the migration 
of border residents based on the agreement, requiring that any requests to move into or out of the 
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country should be inspected by county-level public security institutions and endorsed by the 
Vietnamese side. ‘Key members of reactionary secret societies, bandits, bullies, spies, former 
Nationalists still committed to counterrevolutionary positions, and criminals’, however, ‘should 
not be permitted to migrate out or in’.117 Through this selective blocking of cross-border flows of 
people and goods, the two regimes aimed to translate their nationwide revolutionary victories into 
increased authority of their states at the border. It was, nonetheless, in the interests of the two 
governments to maintain the ‘permeability of borders’,118 given that neither of them was able to 
supply all the necessary resources to secure the basic livelihood of the borderlanders. 
Despite a carefully planned land-swapping project, the two countries encountered enormous 
difficulty in promptly eliminating the cross-border agriculture. During the scheduled land survey 
conducted by Guangxi and Guangdong in the frontier counties, provincial officials finally realized 
the sheer scale of cross-border farming. According to a Guangxi report to the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry, ‘more than 800 households in the province, including a considerable number of Zhuang, 
Yao, Miao (Mèo), Lo Lo (Lô Lô), and Kinh ethnic minorities, farmed on the other side of the 
borderline’. More importantly, except in a few commercially oriented towns, people involved in 
cross-border agriculture depended on a good harvest in Vietnam for their very existence.119 In late 
1956, Hanoi retreated from its original position of demanding payment of overdue tax of cross-
border farming largely due to the bureaucratic costs of figuring out the exact amount of the tax. 
The two sides agreed to levy agricultural taxes on cross-border farming from 1957 based on the 
law of the country where the land was located, while exempting the overdue amount before 
1956. 120  In March 1957, Beijing further reversed its policy of discouraging cross-border 
agriculture by instructing the Guangdong provincial government that all cross-border crop fields, 
except those that had already been swapped or returned, should be left in their status quo. The local 
officials no longer needed to persuade people to give up cross-border farming. Moreover, the 
Chinese State Council ordered the border provinces to be more flexible on activities such as 
grazing cattle and obtaining firewood across the border so long as doing so did not jeopardize the 
interests of Vietnam. Meanwhile, the border counties were granted more authority to solve cross-
border issues through consultation with the local Vietnamese officials.121  
The changing attitude of Beijing and Hanoi toward the cross-border agriculture and its tax 
implications symbolized the gap between policy making and implementation at the political 
periphery. While the local administrations were more capable of discovering and recording the 
cross-border movements of people and goods than before, be they considered legal or illegal, they 
were not always committed to containing these activities. The native populations still enjoyed 
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considerable leeway against the state by, for example, crossing the border spontaneously for the 
sake of their livelihood. After Hanoi placed more restrictions on the small-scale border trade in 
July 1957, the Chinese border police at Friendship Pass detected approximately 100 Vietnamese 
citizens each day who entered China through small mountain trails without travel documents and 
traded with the Chinese without any trade permits, whereas the number was only around ten before 
August. 122  With the increasing radicalization of Chinese politics following the Anti-Rightist 
Movement in 1957, the reported cases of Chinese sneaking into Vietnam within the patrolling area 
of the Friendship Pass Border Authority more than doubled, from 132 in 1957 to 291 in the 
following year.123 Most people caught for illegally crossing the border were required to attend an 
education session on the government policy and were then released, which was hardly enough to 
deter further unlawful border crossing.  
In short, the Communist states carefully designed an internationally coordinated project to 
extend their reach into the borderlands, yet were pushed back by the realities on the ground. This 
illustrates the gap between the demanding tasks assumed by the border administrations and their 
limited strength. Diplomatic historians and political scientists, for example, argue that during the 
Cold War, China often attempted to use the settlement of border issues with neighbours (especially 
by making a compromise with them) to bargain for broader foreign policy objectives or to address 
internal threats to regime security.124 In the border region, it turned out that the state had to pursue 
multiple objectives, including but not limited to foreign policy goals. It not only produced 
authoritarian institutions but also had to offer promises of prosperity to the people.  
Guidelines for border inspection drafted by the Guangxi Military Region Command in October 
1956 best highlighted the heavy burden laid on local cadres. It stipulated that the border garrison 
and police should ‘enforce the border check rules and regulations while taking into consideration 
the long existent customs between inhabitants of the two sides, the political awareness of the 
people, and reality in Vietnam. They needed to crush the enemy efficiently and to win the sincere 
support of the people at the same time. In all, they must strengthen the Sino-Vietnamese 
comradeship and consolidate border defence by striking a balance and making steady 
progress’.125This requirement revealed the fundamental obstacle encountered by grassroots state 
institutions at the border. Being part of the street-level bureaucracy dispatched to a remote, 
unfamiliar society that had historically resisted intrusion by the central state, border authorities 
nevertheless were expected to accomplish a five-fold, internally contradictory mission.  
 
Conclusion: toward a non-linear history of state-building at the frontier 
 
The cases examined in this article reveal the profound impact of the Communist state-building that 
simultaneously took place in the PRC and the DRV on the sometimes troubled socialist partnership 
between Beijing and Hanoi. In traditional narratives of Chinese-Vietnamese relations, the years 
immediately after the end of the Geneva Conference of 1954 witnessed the consolidation of the 
lips and teeth relationship between the two countries. Perceiving threat from the American-
sponsored SEATO, the leadership in Beijing ‘viewed the DRV as the keystone of their national 
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security perimeter in Southeast Asia’.126 Meanwhile, diplomatic support and economic assistance 
from China were essential to the DRV’s endeavours to reconstruct and develop its economy, 
although the backfiring of land reform in Vietnam led the VWP leaders to question the Maoist 
revolutionary model.127 The border issues that eventually became the pretext for China’s punitive 
invasion of the Vietnamese border provinces during the Third Indochina War initially appeared to 
be a matter of relatively little significance. This article, however, highlights that what happened 
on the Chinese-Vietnamese borderlands in the mid-1950s epitomized a profound transformation 
in the characteristics of Chinese-Vietnamese relations. While the inter-party ties between the CCP 
and the VWP remained the core of the relationship, the two socialist countries began to interact as 
modern states in making border boundaries and strengthening border institutions. The period from 
1954 to 1957 witnessed their mutual endeavours to adjust their roles from revolutionaries to ruling 
elites by, in the words of James Scott,  ‘seeing like a state’ in the border region.128 They launched 
large-scale authoritarian plans that did violence to the complex interdependencies in the frontiers 
that were not and could not be fully understood by the state institutions, which were alien to the 
indigenous societies. 
That the PRC and the DRV had a similar political system and trajectory of state-building 
apparently worked to the advantage of the two centralizing states’ political projects at the border. 
On the one hand, the Cold War geopoliticized the border region and led the two Communist 
countries to cooperate in guarding against any potential subversions. On the other hand, addressing 
the ambiguity at the border was essential to constructing a socialist country that was more 
‘centralized, bureaucratic and mass-incorporating’ with ‘enhanced great-power potential in the 
international arena’.129 Located between two newly established Communist regimes, the Sino-
Vietnamese border was subject to parallel state schemes to increase institutional presence and 
strength, which often took the shape of coordinated efforts by the two Communist states to remould 
the murky ‘soft’ boundary into a clearly defined ‘hard’ one. While border-making also occurred 
in other border provinces of the two countries, and in all post-colonial states more broadly, what 
distinguished the China-Vietnam border was a distinct international dimension of state-building, 
namely, the significant impact of the Cold War partnership. This joint state-building project at the 
frontier made it increasingly difficult for the local residents to escape or evade the state, due to 
collaborative measures introduced by the two Communist regimes to make the inhabitants’ daily 
lives visible, trackable, and exploitable by the state.130 
However, there was no linear process toward a stronger state at the border. Instead, the state had 
to strike a balance between the construction of socialism and political realism on the ground. This 
dilemma was often caused by cultural nationalism, the presence of disputed areas, the prevalence 
of local hierarchies, and the absence of central government authority. Moreover, the limits to the 
reach and complexity of the state at the border were in no small part due to the different priorities 
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and gaps of available resources between the political centre and the local state. This problem was 
especially severe in China, where the Southwestern border was a remote corner of the country.131 
The structural and geographical location of the local state at the border meant that it sometimes 
was more prone to the challenge of being ‘asked to be all things to all people’ than officials in the 
inland.132 The local state had to deal with foreign affairs on a daily basis, yet did not always have 
the organizational complexity, cultural expertise, or fiscal capability to carry out a coherent foreign 
policy. It was not an uncommon belief among local officials that pursuing foreign policy diverted 
resources from state projects that could more directly contribute to the socialist transformation. 
Furthermore, the conflation of the Communist Party with the administrative state led to the 
‘essential indivisibility of ideology, civil administration and national defence’133 and to conflicts 
among the goals of the three spheres.  
During the early Cold War era, the PRC and the DRV shared not only common borders but also 
a common ideology, political system, and trajectory of state-building. The Chinese and 
Vietnamese Communist states, however, were rolled back after 1958 because the Great Leap 
Forward in China and the agricultural cooperatization in Vietnam threatened the livelihood of the 
borderlanders and alienated the population from the local officials. Chinese and Vietnamese 
Communists viewed the border-making endeavours of each other mostly in a positive light in the 
1950s because the process was deemed conducive to turning their own border society inward 
toward the political centre and to fostering a stronger socialist solidarity. With the rise of 
nationalism in both countries in the 1970s, potential conflicts of national interests between the two 
countries at the frontiers emerged. Disputes between the Chinese and Vietnamese border citizens 
over crop fields, water, and other resources, mostly resulting from the declining state strength vis-
à-vis the indigenous society since the late 1950s, eventually became one of the most effective 
mobilization tools for Beijing and Hanoi in their decade-long confrontation at the border after 1979.  
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